COIN: Is Current Doctrine Counterfeit?

A Monograph
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Abstract

COIN: Is Current Doctrine Counterfeit? by Lt Colonel Micah I. Nodine, USAF, 44 pages.

While the outcome of the Iraq war seems to have validated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24, the war in Afghanistan seems to indicate there are fundamental problems associated with its historical principles and concepts. Dr. Kilcullen and Dr. Gorka asserted in a recent Joint Forces Quarterly article that the Army has relied on an incomplete set of examples to form current COIN doctrine.

To evaluate their claim, this monograph answers two questions. Namely, do Gorka and Kilcullen accurately describe the defects in the Army COIN doctrine's development, and, second, does the failure to study examples of civil wars and revolutions matter? To answer these questions required an examination of past and present U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine to determine what doctrinal tenets were transferred from one document to the next, comparing historical examples used in previous doctrine and current doctrine, and determining whether current COIN doctrine lacks examples of civil wars and revolutions. To answer the second question, it was necessary to select and examine recent civil wars. The civil wars in Burundi and Mozambique proved useful for answering that question because the warring parties involved exhibited characteristics not addressed in current doctrine.

The research showed that current COIN doctrine failed to study civil wars and is limited to a select group of typical counterinsurgency examples. Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine is not comprehensive enough to address the many contextual situations surrounding the multiple examples of civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies around the world. The claims of Gorka and Kilcullen are valid and would benefit from further examination.

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Introduction

Over the past few years, there has been a recurring debate over whether current United States Army doctrine adequately addresses the counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare environment. The argument has centered on whether the population or enemy focus of COIN doctrine has caused the United States to adopt an ill-informed approach to a COIN environment.[1] The recent Arab uprisings against autocratic rule and the use of U.S. forces in support of insurgents in Libya demonstrate the United States is willing to engage in a warfare that differs from what current COIN doctrine denotes as counterinsurgency warfare. Within this argument, concern has risen about whether the authors of current COIN doctrine failed in their assessment of historical examples to address non-Western insurgencies, revolutions, or civil wars or merely selected those case studies that fit the more comfortable model of insurgencies. It is important for any military officers who plan or engage in COIN warfare to have at their disposal the most complete doctrine available, derived from thorough research of past conflicts. The development of plans to wage an effective counterinsurgency comes from this doctrine. The 2006 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* focuses on efforts and lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq.[2] Drs. Sebastian L. v. Gorka and David Kilcullen recently offered a fervent argument that current Army doctrine writers have been selective in their case studies and, consequently, have provided limited guidance for situations that are atypical.[3]

In the January 2011 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Gorka and Kilcullen asserted that the U.S. Army had erred during the preparation of the 2006 version of COIN doctrine. Gorka and Kilcullen observed that the writers of the COIN manual examined only Western postcolonial and Marxist insurgencies. Choosing mainly the French-Algerian insurgency, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Malaya, and Vietnam as their primary examples of insurgency, current doctrine writers did not research other examples from which to draw lessons. Gorka and Kilcullen state that when doctrine writers chose to ignore a certain insurgency they did so because they labeled the insurgency a civil war or revolution. Gorka and Kilcullen also point out another flaw. The well-studied historical examples relied on by the Army doctrine writers are incorrectly lumped together without regard to the different strategic contexts and end states.[4] They determined

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[1] Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review 85*, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 2-15.

[2] James W. Vizzard and Timothy A. Capron, "Exporting General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Field Manual 3-24 and the U.S. Government's Implementation," *Public Administration Review* 70, no. 3 (May/June 2010):485-493.

[3] Sebastian L. v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-centric theory of War: Understanding the Difference between COIN and Counterinsurgency," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 60 (1st Quarter, January 2011): 15.

[4] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15.

that doctrine writers have created a COIN doctrine that fits within a predetermined framework of ideal types and have given the U.S. Army an incomplete product from which to derive its plans.

Recent events in North Africa and Libya provide an opportunity to examine Gorka and Kilcullen's arguments. The conflicts in Libya and North Africa are different from any other the U.S. military has faced.[5] The examples and main ideas of past and present doctrine writers have remained within a familiar body of research to validate how the U.S. Army should conduct COIN operations.[6] Gorka and Kilcullen assert that examples such as the conflicts in Angola, Greece, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other atypical conflicts can provide lessons on counterinsurgency not found in current doctrine.[7]

The critique by Gorka and Kilcullen leads to two questions. First, do Gorka and Kilcullen accurately describe the defects in the Army COIN doctrine's development? Second, does the failure to study examples of civil wars and revolutions matter? Answering the latter question requires examining past and present U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine to determine what doctrinal tenets were transferred from one document to the next, comparing historical examples used in previous doctrine and current doctrine, and determining whether current COIN doctrine lacks of examples of civil wars and revolutions. To answer the second question, it was necessary to select and examine recent civil wars. As will be made clear, the civil wars in Burundi and Mozambique proved useful for answering that question.

The conflicts in Burundi and Mozambique provide good examples of warfare that does not fit into the current framework of COIN doctrine. Current doctrine focuses on establishing programs and operations designed to legitimize a country's government. FM 3-24 states that the aim of an effective counterinsurgency is to make the people of a country accept the government as legitimate and work to isolate that population from the insurgency.[8] The nation of Burundi provides a good example of a society in which a military force would hard pressed to find a population to secure from insurgents.[9] The research shows that Burundi is an example of a

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[5] Thomas Rid, "The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 5 (October 2010): 727-758.

[6] Laleh Khalili, "The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency," *Middle East Report*, no. 255 (Summer 2010): 121, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/new-old-classics-counterinsurgency (accessed 16 April 2012).

[7] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15.

[8] Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.

[9] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Africa,* vol. 1 of *Understanding Civil War* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005), 17.

country with a government divided along ethnic lines. No government composed from either ethnic population enjoys the support of the other ethnic group. Mozambique offers an opportunity to observe how an internal grievance can be enflamed by outside agents to provoke a civil war. These case studies provide insight into the difference between using military forces in an insurgency and supporting one party of a civil war.

To determine whether Gorka and Kilcullen were correct in their assertion that current COIN doctrine development has been defective, it was necessary to examine past U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine and ascertain what tenets the authors of current COIN doctrine carried forward from the past to the present. This research explored the development of counterinsurgency doctrine from right after World War II until publication of the 2006 version of FM 3-24. The evidence collected from the series of doctrine manual showed that certain tenets moved from the past to present without serious modification.

After World War II, doctrine writers focused on how the German army handled the Soviet partisan movement to derive initial lessons on how to handle a counterinsurgency.[10] The early doctrine focused on dealing with a anti-partisan operations in military occupied countries. Field Manual 31-20 *Operations against Guerrilla Forces* was published in 1951 within the context of the Cold War.[11] The manual introduced the idea of treating citizens in occupied country with respect and dignity. The counterinsurgency effort focused on denying opportunities for revolution such as the Germans faced from the partisans in World War II. Current doctrine preserves these lessons in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* by describing the history of insurgencies and reiterating the need for the counterinsurgent to respect the population and to be culturally aware.[12]

During the Cold War era leading up to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, COIN doctrine searched for a description or definition of counterinsurgency operations.[13] COIN doctrine used the term *guerrillas* in 1951 to describe insurgents, but in the Vietnam era the doctrine simply defined insurgents as irregular forces.[14] Current doctrine has defined insurgencies as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of

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[10] Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942–1976* (Washington, DC: United States Army, Center of Military History, 2006), 3.

[11] U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-20: Operations against Guerrilla Forces* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1951), 4.

[12] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1–4.

[13] Rid, "Nineteenth Century Origins," 727-758.

[14] Field Manual 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces.* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1961), 1-1.

subversion and armed conflict."[15] Current doctrine further states that political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.[16] By narrowly focusing the scope of the definition of an insurgency, doctrine has neglected cases where political power is not the governing factor or reason for conflict. The two case studies of Burundi and Mozambique provide some examples of conflicts that lie outside current COIN doctrine definitions of insurgency. However, this research shows that lessons drawn from these oft-neglected case studies are based on writers' failure to acknowledge that the goal of an insurgency could be motivated by something other than politics.

The research showed that while current U.S. COIN doctrine has brought counterinsurgency concepts to the forefront, those ideas are not new, nor have those ideas been radically altered. In fact, the research showed that the use of selective historical examples to inform current doctrine has not adequately addressed conflicts in which the United States has found itself in after Iraq and Afghanistan. This research does not assess current doctrine as a failure, but rather it contends that there are historical examples of insurgencies that are more relevant to contemporary concerns and, hence, should inform current COIN doctrine. Current U.S. COIN doctrine has drawn key tenets from observations dating back to World War II with only minor adjustments along the way. This research concluded that Gorka and Kilcullen were correct in stating that the doctrine writers in 2006 relied on previous historical examples and past Army doctrine to formulate the general concept in the current COIN manual. Further evidence gathered during the research leads to the conclusion that case, such as Burundi and Mozambique offer a variety of lessons that should inform *Field Manual 3-24.*

Doctrine Foundations

The authors of current COIN doctrine sought to bring the notions of insurgency warfare back to the forefront, because the United States was having a difficult time waging the counterinsurgency war in Iraq.[17] A key achievement of the 2006 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* was to focus American foreign and military policymakers on a unified approach for understanding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[18] The authors and the subsequent doctrine were very successful in drawing attention to the differences in waging a war against an insurgency versus major combat operations. This manual provides a workable operational framework to guide planners in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Current COIN doctrine focuses on the security of the population from insurgents as paramount over the

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[15] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Vizzard and Capron, "Exporting Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Doctrine," 485-493.

[18] Khalil, "Classics of Counterinsurgency," 14.

killing or capturing of the enemy.[19] Securing the population as the means for waging an effective counterinsurgency resonates throughout the history of COIN doctrine dating back to 1951.

Two distinct historical classes of insurgencies informed current doctrine. The two main influences on modern counterinsurgency thought have been anti-colonial independence movements and Marxist revolutions.[20] The current 2006 version of COIN doctrine refers to these specific types of conflicts when defining insurgency.[21] Current doctrine derives its foundational ideas by building upon previous themes in relation to the current conflict at hand. Instead of differentiating between the contexts that surrounded each individual historical example or recognizing other conflicts that do not fit those previous themes, doctrine writers chose to focus only on those historical examples that fall into the aforementioned categories.[22]

Current doctrine did not look at historical examples of revolutions or even insurgencies in which a Western power played little to no direct role.[23] All of the better-known examples of counterinsurgency are limited to cases where a colonial or post-imperial government fought in the territory of the former colony.[24] In the majority of these cases, the insurgent was interested in self-determination or a similar politically (as opposed to religiously) motivated goal. Limiting the historical examples to a particular set of cases that fit the typical model limits the scope of supporting research. An important fact to note is that none of the insurgents discussed within current doctrine were religiously motivated and seeking to create a global revolution.[25] The 2006 version of *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency* states quite clearly that the goal of the insurgent is politically motivated.[26]

The doctrinal principles that resulted in the 2006 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* were shaped not by the lessons of past centuries of war against nonstate actors but by the limited experiences of Western nations during the twentieth century.[27] To answer the question posed in the introduction about whether Gorka and Kilcullen were correct

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[19] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

[20] Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN,* Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 05-2, September 2005 (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2005), 21.

[21] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1–1-8.

[22] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 16.

[23] Ibid., 15.

[24] Michael C. Fowler, *Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 36.

[25] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 16.

[26] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

[27] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15.

in their assertion that COIN doctrine was defective in its formulation; this research looked at the history of COIN doctrine. By studying the context and foundational theories that aided the doctrine writers in the formulation of the various COIN doctrines it became clear that certain themes continued to resonate from one rewrite to the next.

Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Fighting insurgents and intervening in the internal affairs of foreign countries were missions the U.S. Army had long performed, but after World War II these missions achieved heightened significance. The outbreak of the Cold War magnified these burdens, as the threat of Communist subversion and the need for the United States to project military power into foreign countries led the U.S. Army to undertake a wide variety of counterinsurgency missions.[28] The extent of these missions and the various methods enemies employed against U.S. forces created some doctrinal confusion, as evidenced by the plethora of terms used to define the enemy.[29] Throughout the history of U.S. doctrine, terms such as *guerrilla, revolutionary, insurgent,* and *partisan* were used to describe the enemy, while terms such as *guerrilla operations, low-intensity conflict, situations short of war, stability operations, revolutionary war, internal defense,* and a myriad of other words were used to describe the operations at hand.[30]

After 1945, American soldiers had no definitive COIN doctrine. The Army relied on a disparate array of lessons learned that had been collected by the main belligerents during World War II.[31] Following the flare-up of tensions that would inevitably result in the Cold War, the U.S. Army took its first steps toward writing a formal counterinsurgency doctrine. The authors arrived at the first codified COIN doctrine, which they labeled a *counterguerrilla doctrine.*[32] The aim of this doctrine was to address concerns in the U.S. Army about how to deal with a guerrilla force intent on disrupting operations behind the main force.[33] The focus of the first COIN doctrine was what might occur during a major conflict with the Soviet Union during the early stages of the Cold War. Because the Soviets had used partisans against Germany during World War II, it seemed logical to assume that the Soviets would employ similar measures in a large-scale conflict with the United States and its allies.[34]

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[28] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 3.

[29] Edwin Corr and Stephen Sloan, *Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 2.

[30] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 4.

[31] Ibid., 11.

[32] Ibid., 24–26.

[33] Corr and Sloan, *Low-Intensity Conflict,* 6.

[34] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 131–33.

Post-World War II Doctrine

The first doctrine was called U.S. Army Field Manual 31-24 *Operations against Guerrilla Forces* and was published in May 1950.[35] During the late 1940s and into 1950, doctrine writers relied on several sources to formulate counterinsurgency doctrine. These sources were derived mostly from firsthand experience during World War II. The experiences ranged from the Soviet Partisan movement and French Resistance to Filipino guerrilla operation during the Japanese occupation. However, these sources only provided limited information because there was no detailed, written history of events beyond personal recollection. The American experiences performing occupation duties and the Axis experience combating Allied resistance movements influenced the development of counterinsurgency doctrine the most.[36]

The experiences Americans gleaned from post-World War II occupations dealt specifically with countries facing Communist rebellions. American doctrine writers also observed how countries under occupation by the Axis powers handled these Communist rebellions.[37] Because of these observations and experiences, doctrine writers decided that the foundation for counterguerrilla operations was to take active political, economic, security, and intelligence measures to redress the causes of discontent or, should that fail, to suppress potential resistance before it could evolve into a full-scale insurgency.[38] This core idea from 1951 has been carried forward to the 2006 version of COIN doctrine as well. The 2006 version of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* begins with a list of historical principles, among which are legitimacy is the main objective; political factors are primary; intelligence drives operations, and security under the rule of law.[39] The same ideas from the 1951 strategic context of political, economic, security, and intelligence programs are the same ideas found in the 2006 version of U.S. COIN doctrine.

The authors of FM 31-20 in 1951 decided on a set of principles gleaned from their level of understanding concerning counterinsurgency warfare to define what an insurgent required to wage an effective guerrilla campaign. These principles stated that guerrillas needed a secure base or cross-border sanctuary from which to operate, external material aid, and a vast network of clandestine agents, propagandists, and support personnel.[40] These principles played an important part in *Field Manual 31-20*'s counterguerrilla strategy. The 2006 version of COIN

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[35] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 134.

[36] FM 31-20 *Guerrilla,* iii.

[37] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 136.

[38] FM 31-20 *Guerrilla,* 63.

[39] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1–1-23.

[40] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 142.

doctrine refers to these very same ideas in its current strategy when dealing with an insurgency.[41]

Korean War Era Doctrine

The precepts of FM 31-20 were widely disseminated throughout the forces thanks in large part to the outbreak of the Korean War.[42] After the Korean War started, the U.S. Army distributed information in pamphlets to commanders in theater to assist in developing techniques to use against Korean guerrilla forces. The pamphlets were widely disseminated to every unit and were the result of analyzing German techniques used against partisan or resistance movements during World War II. The distribution of these pamphlets along with editorials in U.S. Army journals ensured that lessons of Germany's counterguerrilla operations during World War II would have profound influence on American doctrine for many years.[43]

Published eight months after the 1951 version of U.S. War Department Basic Field Manual 31-10 *Coast Defense,* a new companion document, found its way into the forces' hands during the throes of the Korean War.[44] The new document was called U.S. Army FM 31-21 *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare.[45]* This companion document was a necessary supplement to Field Manual 31-20. It helped U.S. ground commanders understand the North Korean guerrilla movement.[46] U.S. forces were constantly faced with an ever-growing North Korean guerrilla movement in their rear areas that caused one general to state, "The North Korean guerillas are . . . at present the single greatest headache to U.S. forces."[47] The goal of the U.S. Army FM 31-21 was to relieve some of those headaches.

The U.S. Army doctrine writers used information gleaned from World War II, German actions against the Soviet Partisan movement, as the basis for writing FM 31-21.[48] Realizing that guerrilla warfare would more than likely take various forms, the authors decided to focus on two types of situations. The first was conflicts conducted by irregular forces, supported by an

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[41]FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-5.

[42] Air War College, *Report of Conference of Commandants of Army Service Schools, 29 January–1 February 1951* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College), 21

[43] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 142.

[44] Ibid., 143; U.S. Department of War, *Basic Field Manual 31-10: Coast Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943).

[45] U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-21: Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1951).

[46] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 143.

[47] John Beebe, "Beating the Guerilla," *Military Review* 35 (December 1955): 10.

[48] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 143.

external power, to bring about a change in the sociopolitical order of a country without engaging it in a formal, declared war. These had happened before 1950 during the Greek Civil War. The second was focused on operations where irregular forces in support of regular forces conducted conventional warfare in a formal, declared war.[49] These two overarching ideas about how insurgencies would be waged were placed firmly in doctrine.

During the Korean War, counterguerrilla warfare doctrine was founded on the observation that counterguerrilla warfare could take various forms, from partisan activities during a conventional war to a people's war or revolution.[50] The underlying premise of counterinsurgency doctrine during this timeframe was that a commander armed with a comprehensive politico-military plan backed by adequate intelligence, psychological, and military resources was ready to undertake pacification operations. The corresponding themes are evident in current 2006 COIN doctrine. The 2006 version of FM 3-24 lists the same methods as effective means toward an effective counterinsurgency.[51]

During the Korean War doctrine recommended that a theater of operations be divided into three zones: areas controlled by guerrillas, areas controlled by the government, and contested areas that usually resided between the two conflicting zones.[52] FM 31-20 stated a commander should move troops into the contested zone, establish bases, and institute adequate security measures. The commander would then establish a military government and enact political, economic, financial, and propaganda measures designed to restore a sense of normalcy and redress any grievances. This would help to establish the legitimacy of the government among the population. The theme of political legitimacy resonates clearly in the 2006 version of U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency.* The 2006 version of COIN doctrine states in many places throughout the document the importance of the population and political policy designed to restore or instill a sense of legitimacy within the unaffected population.[53]

A primary element of FM 31-20 and its companion document, FM 31-21*,* was the requirement to maintain personnel and policy continuity throughout the operation.[54] Continuity reduced obstructions to communication between regional commanders in theater. This brought about a sense of unity in both command and message during counterinsurgency operations. The same concept of unity of effort exists in the 2006 version of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency.* The

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[49] Ibid., 142.

[50] FM 31-21 *Guerrilla,* 32.

[51] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-19.

[52] FM 31-21 *Guerrilla,* 76–77.

[53] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-20.

[54] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 144.

2006 version of COIN doctrine states, "Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation."[55] The 2006 version of doctrine goes on to exhort commanders to produce a seamless program because any seam in unity of command or effort leads to exploitation by the enemy, resulting in an incoherent plan and counterproductive results. The doctrine authors had observed that during World War II, in the Philippines and Russia, guerrilla units had moved along the geographical boundaries separating zones of operation, exploiting the seams in communication between commanders.[56] The failure of commanders to communicate their actions or share intelligence across boundaries led to a prolonged insurgency. FM 3-24 recognizes that an insurgency is usually a protracted affair with the insurgent having the means and initiative at the onset.[57] Unity of effort, rooted in the post-World War II environment, fostered through the Korean War, still finds a place in current COIN doctrine.

Emphasis on unity of effort and other principles remained elements of counterinsurgency doctrine up to 1954 and the end of the Korean War. The U.S. Army went through an organizational change after the Korean War that resulted in the consolidation and removal of certain elements of COIN doctrine from the various doctrine documents.[58] The Army consolidated and reduced the amount of material discussing counterinsurgency operations and published FM 100-5 *Field Service Regulations, Operations* in 1958.[59] The change set adrift the former counterinsurgency doctrine and the U.S. Army on a course of neglect that in 1961 saw the U.S. Army enter into another conflict in Vietnam without the supporting doctrine.[60]

Vietnam War Era Doctrine

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was growing increasingly wary of the growing Communist insurgencies around the globe in 1958. As president, Eisenhower stated adamantly that his policy for the United States was to avoid becoming involved in insurgency warfare.[61] This presidential policy further retarded growth in counterinsurgency doctrine. The U.S. Army remained focused on nuclear warfare and was ill prepared for the outbreak of hostilities in Vietnam. The Army had neither the training nor a supporting counterinsurgency doctrine.

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[55] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-22.

[56] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 55–66.

[57] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-6.

[58] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 151.

[59] U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations, Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954).

[60] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 151.

[61] Donald Carter, "From G.I. to Atomic Soldier: The Development of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1945–1956" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1987), 170–78.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Vietnam looming, the U.S. Army was forced to rely on the 1958 FM 100-5 *Field Service Regulations, Operations* for guidance in operations against the Viet Cong insurgents.[62] The counterinsurgency guidance in the 1958 version of FM 100-5 was not comprehensive and could not meet the operational requirement for fighting a large-scale insurgency, so doctrine writers looked to French and British examples to bolster the doctrine.[63] In 1960, the U.S. Army distributed copies of the British manual *The Conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya* to all of its service schools for the use in formulating new doctrine.[64] The examples drawn from French and British experiences in Algeria and Malaya became the basis for the new COIN doctrine for the Vietnam War. Gorka and Kilcullen refer to the reliance on French and British counterinsurgency experience as a defect in the development of current COIN doctrine.[65]

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy set a new direction for U.S. policy. He called for the creation of a more robust and flexible conventional military force.[66] This new direction appealed to U.S. Army leaders and doctrine writers as they sought ways to reinvigorate the counterinsurgency discussion and bring change to current doctrine. Published in 1961 as Change 1 to FM 100-1 *Doctrinal Guidance,* "Military Operations against Irregular Forces" was an important document. It signaled a change in U.S. Army strategy toward counterguerrilla warfare.[67] Doctrine no longer saw guerrilla warfare as generic or a means to secure rear areas, but rather embraced the concept of Third World revolution or the Maoist-style people's war. Doctrine produced new terms, but many of the ideas, concepts, and techniques were just reframed from the 1951 FM 31-20.[68]

The basic counterinsurgency doctrinal concept during the Vietnam War was a clear, build, and hold.[69] The 1961 counterinsurgency doctrine found in FM 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces* was governed by the concept that a zone had to be cleared of insurgents and a military government established to assert authority. FM 31-15 stated three main objectives of any military action during a counterinsurgency. The first objective was to isolate guerrillas from the civilian population. Because sound policies would woo the population from the guerrillas,

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[62] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 162.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15–16.

[66] Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), 60–64.

[67] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 170.

[68] Ibid., 171.

[69] FM 31-15 *Irregular,* 29–31.

military action was required to break up guerrilla bands and drive them from populated areas. Realizing that guerrilla forces would conduct reprisal attacks against any local population assisting occupying forces, doctrine writers called for the formation of village self-defense groups.[70]

After isolating insurgents from the population, the next major counterinsurgency objective was to deny access to external support. Doctrine did not give any specific measures or ideas about how to sever this line of communication, because this line of effort relied on diplomatic and economic efforts that were outside the U.S. Army's control. The last objective was the destruction of guerilla forces through aggressive combat operations. FM 31-20 called for active combat patrolling to break up, harass, and destroy guerrilla forces. The idea was to avoid lulls in fighting to prevent the guerrillas from resting and recovering.[71]

Doctrine called for the completely cleansing an area by destroying all enemy forces before moving on to the next area.[72] Doctrine writers relied on lessons learned from Germany on how to protect internal lines of communication, and the writers promoted the concept that a defensive posture led to decreased morale and ceded the initiative to the enemy. The goal of maintaining the offensive during counterinsurgency operations was not only to defeat the guerrillas but also to defeat their will and that of the population supporting them. Doctrine stated that control of terrain was not paramount, as insurgents rarely sought set-piece battles, but rather that enemy forces were the objective. The goal was to prevent the re-infiltration of enemy forces into previously cleared areas.[73]

When President Kennedy challenged the military, especially the U.S. Army, focus attention on flexible responses to conflicts around the world rather than large-scale, nuclear war, doctrine writers, nevertheless, continued to draw lessons from the German examples from World War II, but also sought to incorporate lessons from the British in Malaya.[74] From the British example in Malaysia, doctrine absorbed lessons on civil-military coordination and administration, jungle tactics, and population-control techniques. From the American experience in the Philippines, the Army derived the role of intelligence, psychological warfare, and civic action in suppressing unrest. These examples were all from Western nations. Because these examples were all judged successful, there was a tendency to overestimate the relative

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[70] Ibid., 36–63.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 235–40.

[73] Ibid., 138.

[74] Ibid., 236.

ease of these operations and the extent to which the population accepted the reforms forced upon them.[75]

During the Vietnam War, the French experience in Algeria started to attract significant attention. The French had lost badly in the Indochina War and were fighting a somewhat successful counterinsurgency in Algeria.[76] Doctrine writers believed the French lost in Indochina due to their colonial policies and failure to produce any significant political, social, or economic reforms there. Army doctrine writers had criticized how the French army conducted the war in Indochina.[77] Doctrine writers and U.S. Army professionals believed the French had been too rigid and conventional in their approach to combating the Vietnamese insurgency during the Indochina War. They also criticized the French forces for occupying small, static posts that robbed them of the initiative. The 2006 version of U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* addresses the requirement for seizing the initiative, "Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency causes . . . [and] involves securing and controlling the local populace and providing essential services."[78] The need to gain and retain the initiative through direct action or supporting actions is mentioned forty-five times in FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency.* To address the concern for initiative in Vietnam and the role it plays in a counterinsurgency, U.S. Army doctrine writers published a new version of counterinsurgency doctrine in 1961.

The product of doctrine writers' research and observations up to 1961 was FM 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces.*[79] Counterinsurgency doctrine did not see another major change until after the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam War, doctrine was changed, and operational lessons were added to address experiences during the war. However, few of the changes were revolutionary. In fact, very few lasting changes occurred in the formulation of new doctrine.[80] The reason for the lack of change was that doctrine writers perceived that the lessons learned were not new at all, but rather reaffirmations of the doctrine already found in published manuals. When a failure did occur, doctrine writers asserted that it was more a failing of intelligence, misapplication of policy, or bureaucratic wrangling than a failure of doctrine.[81]

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[75] Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannon, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (Washington, DC: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 36–43.

[76] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 163.

[77] Ibid.

[78] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-3.

[79] FM 31-15 *Irregular,* 29–31.

[80] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 235.

[81] Ibid., 468.

After the Vietnam War, the Army used the 1967 version of FM 31-16 *Counterguerrilla Operations* until 1981.[82] In 1981, that manual was eliminated, and no replacement was provided until 1986. A desire to forget the unhappy period of the Vietnam War was a factor in why the U.S. Army shied away from producing any substantive doctrine. There also was a prevailing idea that the lessons learned from Vietnam had already been captured in the 1970 Change 1 to FM 31-16. However, the failure to produce new doctrine did not prevent individual soldiers from capturing their own lessons and attempting to bring those lessons to the forefront in subsequent iterations of COIN doctrine in later years.[83]

Despite some minor changes and adjustments to the doctrinal numbering system for COIN doctrine and associated publications and manuals, no substantial change to doctrine occurred until General David Petraeus led a drive to reexamine U.S. Army COIN doctrine following the setbacks in Iraq in 2005.[84] An interesting addition to the development of current COIN doctrine was the effect the French and especially French Lieutenant Colonel David Galula, had in the formation and subsequent iterations of COIN doctrine. Galula's influence is evident from the citations in the acknowledgement section of the 2006 version of FM 3-24.[85] The substantial influence of his writings throughout the 2006 version as will be shown.

French Influence on Doctrine

The French counterinsurgency experiences were initially discredited by U.S. Army doctrine writers mainly due to the perception that the French had failed. However, French experiences began to influence modern U.S. Army doctrine in a large way following the Vietnam War.[86] U.S. Army doctrine writers and students of history had been skeptical of the French and their strategy in large part because the French had been defeated by the Vietnamese during the Indochina War.[87] Today the French influence is evident in FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. The French experience in Algeria and, specifically, Galula's writings are woven into the current definition of an insurgency and guidance for effectively fighting counterinsurgency. Galula's background and experience in Algeria reveals a great deal about the source for many of the concepts in current Army doctrine.

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[82] U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-16: Counterguerrilla Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1963).

[83] Ibid., 269.

[84] Beatrice Heuser, "The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 171.

[85] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, viii.

[86] Birtle, *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations,* 153.

[87] Ibid.

Background on Galula's Experience

Galula wrote a book on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency that drew heavily from the French experience in Algeria.[88] Written during the waning days of French imperialism, Galula's book expressed his thoughts on how the French failed to adopt a comprehensive approach toward combating the insurgency in Algeria.[89] A major contention with Galula's writings is that he drew too many theoretical lessons from his limited experience with counterinsurgency in a small rural area in Algeria.[90] Galula espoused a theory of population-centric warfare to combat an insurgency that resonated with the specific strategic and operational context the French had faced in Algeria.[91]

Galula collected observations about insurgencies when the French were conducting indiscriminate raids against locals in Algeria, and not just raids against insurgents. The French adopted a local Bedouin practice called *razzia.* This was almost a Bedouin sport at the time. Razzia involved marauding tribesmen conducting raids designed to seize property and resources from a neighboring tribe, but to avoid the loss of life.[92] The French saw razzia as an accepted local practice and used it not only to feed off the land but also to gather prisoners and degrade the insurgent tribes' ability to wage an insurgency. The raids were no more than organized looting but were widely accepted among French military officers as a necessary step toward crushing the Algerian insurgency. The raids did nothing more than further isolate the indigenous population from the local government. The use of this tactic against a population brought a concern for civilian populations into military thinking.[93]

The futility of using razzia as a means to support their army abroad and to quell the insurgency led officers like Galula and Colonel Roger Trinquier to question whether the French had it right.[94] Another French officer, Charles Richard, wrote, "If one sets out to conquer a country, in the world's true sense, there are two conquests one has to accomplish: that of the land is the material conquest, and that of the people is the moral conquest."[95] The 2006 version FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* also seizes upon this theoretical thought by stating, "Killing

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[88] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005).

[89] Rid, "Nineteenth Century Origins," 729.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 730.

[92] Ibid., 729–34.

[93] Ibid., 731–33.

[94] Ibid., 751.

[95] Ibid., 751

insurgents—while necessary—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency . . . [but] requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency's cause through stability operations as well."[96]

A few years removed from Algeria, Galula and other French military theorists influenced French counterinsurgency operations in Madagascar. They developed their original line of thinking further in Madagascar.[97] The French adopted a policy called the *taches d'huile*, or oil slick/stain, method of waging a counterinsurgency. The oil slick policy focused on regarding the population as the central battleground that needed not only to be secured and protected from insurgent violence, but also to be persuaded that working with the French government was better for them than letting the insurgents have control.[98] However, an often omitted principle of the oil-slick method was the notion that to protect the population counterinsurgents had to attack the insurgents' soil, their foundation, to turn the population into the counterinsurgents' foremost helper.[99] Behind these practices, the idea was to grow and extend the periphery of the secured areas much like the way that oil spreads over water, thereby reducing the territory that insurgents controlled and limiting their ability to resupply and rearm themselves.

Galula's book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* is one of the most quoted references in current FM 3-24. For Galula, victory in a counterinsurgency war focused on isolating insurgents from the population. Galula and his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* have demonstrably affected the authors of FM 3-25 *Counterinsurgency*. Apart from the acknowledgment in the manual, the ideas and insight Galula expressed in his book are carried forward as a means to understand an insurgency and how to effectively fight a counterinsurgency war.[100] Galula's influence is visible because definitions used in his book, are also found in the COIN doctrine. The similarity between the definitions in Galula's book and those in FM 3-24 will be discussed later. The controlling idea in Galula's work was his population-centered approach to counterinsurgency. That idea is evident in the FM 3-24, which warns against overemphasizing killing insurgents rather than securing and engaging the populace.[101]

More of Galula's ideas are prevalent in current U.S. doctrine as well. In his book, Galula wrote that success comes from the interaction of three main approaches toward the civilian

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[96] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-3.

[97] Rid, "Nineteenth Century Origins," 753.

[98] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 136.

[99] Rid, "Nineteenth Century Origins," 752.

[100] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 58–63.

[101] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-29.

population. These approaches consist of the military approach, police and judicial approach, and political approach.[102] The military approach consists of engaging in direct action against insurgents. The police and judicial approach involves arresting and interrogating insurgent political agents and rehabilitating those who are amenable. The political approach consists of reaching out to the populace by enforcing laws, establishing local elections, and "doing all of the constructive work needed to win the wholehearted support of the population."[103] The 2006 version FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* expresses the same thoughts by stating successful practices in a counterinsurgency include emphasizing intelligence, focusing on population needs and security, establishing and expanding security areas, and providing amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.[104]

Direct evidence of the heavy influence Galula and the French experience in Algeria had on current doctrine is found right in the bibliography of FM 3-24. In the annotated bibliography there is a section titled, The Classics.[105] This section cites authors such as Galula, Alistair Horne, Jean Lartéguy, and Roger Trinquier. These authors wrote on the Algerian insurgency, and their ideas are embedded throughout the Army manual. Galula's book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* and FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* have so many similar lines of thinking that examining them all would exceed the scope of this research. However, key areas help answer the question of whether Gorka and Kilcullen were correct in asserting that current U.S. Army doctrine writers relied heavily on Western nations' experiences in counterinsurgency as the foundation for doctrine.[106]

One of the key similarities between Galula's book and the 2006 version of COIN doctrine is the description of the elements of an insurgency. Galula defines those elements as a cause upon which a political party forms, the means to conduct guerrilla warfare, outside support, interior support from the population, and a mass of followers willing to fill the other elements as needed.[107] The 2006 version of COIN doctrine defines the elements of an insurgency as movement leaders, combatants, political cadre, auxiliaries (external support), and a mass base (the bulk of the membership).[108] The context of Galula's writings in 1964 and U.S. doctrine in 2006 are very different, yet the assumptions and lessons remain the same.

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[102] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 87.

[103] Ibid.

[104] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-29.

[105] Ibid., Annotated Bibliography-1.

[106] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15–16.

[107] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 17–54.

[108] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-11.

Current doctrine lies along the same lines of thought as the preceding doctrine. Thinking has not radically changed or altered the manner in which the U.S. Army prepares and engages in counterinsurgency warfare. Relying on historical examples without due regard to the strategic context that surrounded those examples and then passing along those ideas as universal truths supports Gorka and Kilcullen's assertion that doctrine has been ill-informed in its foundation since 1948. Another connection between Galula and current doctrine are the definitions of insurgency, civil war, and revolution.

Insurgency, Revolution, and Civil War Defined

Definitions are useful to understand how Western writers think about the incongruities of warfare and help to ascertain why current doctrine writers have omitted other forms of warfare from their historical examples. The idea of insurgencies can be traced to many points in history. Whether a group is labeled an insurgency or not stems from how the international community wishes to define a conflict. Whether Western nations recognized conflicts as insurgencies can limit whether writers assessed broad historical examples when writing doctrine. These next few sections will address how insurgency, civil war, and revolution have been defined.

Insurgency Defined

Current U.S. Army doctrine has defined insurgencies as complex subsets of warfare.[109] Doctrine notes that warfare has remained relatively unchanged throughout history as groups seek to gain enough support and exercise enough violence to achieve political aims.[110] Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine shares the same definition with *Joint Publication 1-02* when it states, "Insurgency is the organized use of subversion or violence by a group or a movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority."[111] Galula defines an insurgency as the pursuit of a policy inside a country by every means.[112] All of these documents share a common picture of an insurgency.

Another way to look at an insurgency according to doctrine is as an organized, sometimes contracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control of an established government while increasing insurgent control.[113] Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine

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[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid., 1-1.

[111] *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, 2010), 165.

[112] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 3.

[113] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

warns against the protracted nature of an insurgency centered on a common cause designed to overthrow the new government.[114] Galula states that an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically to attain specific objectives leading to the overthrow of the existing order.[115] All three of these documents again share a common definition for an insurgency and the goals the insurgent is attempting to achieve.

The agreed-upon definition of insurgency in current U.S. military doctrine seems to lead toward a unified understanding that an insurgency is a protracted struggle between a small group and a standing government to facilitate a change in the perceived status quo.[116] Doctrine states that political power is the central issue in an insurgency and counterinsurgency, as each side seeks to get the population to accept its own form of governance.[117] Using Galula's definition in current doctrine demonstrates a bias toward lumping all insurgencies and their goals under one umbrella, thereby ignoring the strategic context of each insurgency.

Revolution Defined

Misagh Parsa defines a revolution as a class action led by a self-conscious group that finds support among other classes.[118] These supporting classes are not fully aware or politically organized but unite under a common cause to move from the previous model of government. Said another way, a revolution occurs when many people become angry when there is a gap between valued things and opportunities to which they feel entitled. A revolution differs from an insurgency in that a revolution tends to be more organized, and more of the mass of citizens within a country join or agree with the cause.[119]

Galula defines a revolution as primarily an internal conflict with occasional external influences coming to bear upon it.[120] He further states a revolution is usually an explosive upheaval—sudden, brief, spontaneous, and unplanned.[121] He describes a revolution as an accident that can only be explained afterword, not predicted.[122] The 2006 version of U.S. Army

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[114] Ibid., 1-6.

[115] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 4.

[116] Eric Jardine, "City Gods and Village Deities: The Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 91, no. 4 (July–August 2011): 54–56.

[117] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

[118] Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8.

[119] Ibid., 9.

[120] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 3.

[121] Ibid.,4.

[122] Ibid.

COIN doctrine follows this same thought as it defines a revolution as an unplanned, spontaneous explosion of popular will.[123] Current U.S. Army doctrine writers again follow the same path of reasoning as Galula when defining a revolution.

The causes and outcomes of revolutions are as varied in history as they are today. The past does inform the present and future by suggesting that revolutions center on the struggle for control of coercive organizations; the struggle for political power over the police and army; and a struggle for justice.[124] In short, revolutions are as varied in their causes as insurgencies; the main difference is the degree of support and recognition that either revolutions or insurgencies attain. A revolution draws on a broad base of class or like-minded population to achieve its goals. An insurgency starts as a smaller group that fights to gain popular support among the populace or simply works directly to decapitate the standing government and thereby exert control over the population.[125]

Civil War Defined

Civil war is not defined in the 2006 version of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. The lack of definition or any attempt to address this form of warfare is explained by examining Galula's definition of civil war. Galula states that an insurgency is civil war, but describes a difference in the form the war takes in each case. He states that civil war suddenly splits a nation into two or more groups, where these groups suddenly find themselves in control of both territory and the existing armed forces.[126] Galula observes that this form of warfare resembles normal international warfare, but the belligerents are common citizens. Because current doctrine writers relied so heavily on Western influences and Galula for foundational insights into counterinsurgency, the exclusion of civil wars appears to have derived from considering civil wars as just another form of conventional hostilities.

Now that similarities in definitions and thoughts regarding insurgencies, revolutions, and civil wars are known, it will be possible to answer the second question of this research. Examining two specific cases of civil war in African nations will answer the question whether these atypical examples matter. The case studies of Burundi and Mozambique offer a small insight into the diversity of historical examples available to doctrine authors. After explaining the history of Burundi's and Mozambique's civil wars, this research will present some insights that will better inform COIN doctrine.

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[123] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-2.

[124] Parsa, *States, Ideologies,* 293.

[125] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare,* 17.

[126] Ibid., 5.

Civil War Case Studies

To ascertain the lessons that can be garnered from civil wars or revolutions that have remained outside the purview of COIN doctrine writers, it is useful to look at two cases. These cases offer a look into different conflicts that have not involved the prototypical Western nation state against an adversary and provide credibility to the thesis that Gorka and Kilcullen postulated in their *Joint Forces Quarterly* article. These two conflicts involving civil wars in Africa illuminate lessons that, if applied to doctrine, will provide a better understanding of the different types of conflicts and their increasing complexity.

Burundi Civil War

Burundi has been involved in a civil war since the mid-1960s. The country has experienced four episodes of civil war since the first recorded outbreak in 1965. The most recent occurrence was in 1993. On the surface, it would appear that political elites' failure to create institutions or programs that can promote peace is the cause for the recurrence of war in the country. That is not the case. In fact, the government instituted programs and policies designed to promote peace after the country won its independence. Those policies, however, provided favors to a small ethnic group of Tutsis who lived within the country's borders. Burundi's population consists of two primary ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis. Policies that favor one of these ethnic groups over the other are at the heart of the civil wars that have plagued this country.[127]

These two ethnic groups have migrated and lived together since the fifteenth century in relative peace and harmony. Because they lived together in peace under a common value system for so many years, it is startling to note how much of a difference there is between these two ethnic groups. While there were some sporadic reports of conflict between Hutu herders and Tutsi farmers in areas where they cohabitated, for the most part the two ethnic groups lived in harmony until Belgian colonial rule. There are three main causes of the civil wars occurring in Burundi in the postcolonial period: Belgium's divide-and-rule policy, regionalism, and the social revolution that occurred in neighboring Rwanda.[128]

Belgium's divide-and-rule policy was to replace Hutu chiefs with Tutsis, thus marginalizing the Hutus' ethnic clan in Burundi. This policy gave a racial overtone to politics, as the once-dynamic social regulation system between Tutsis and Hutus was shattered. This policy created an imbalance of power, with the Tutsis dominating the Hutus and the other smaller,

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[127] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 17.

[128] Ibid., 36.

lesser known ethnic tribes within Burundi. This caused deep-rooted hatred within both groups, fueling resentment against the Tutsis and leading to conflict.[129]

A second factor is regionalism. The ruling Tutsis came predominately from the southern province and promoted exclusionary policies that resulted in skewed income distribution and tensions between the two groups. The process of regional exclusion led to a policy by the Tutsis against any other ethnic group, causing untold suffering and poverty in other regions. This regional exclusionary policy only fed grievances that the divide-and-rule policy had caused. These tensions have been the root cause for the recurring violence and conflict between the ethnic groups within Burundi.[130]

A third factor is the social revolution within Rwanda. The Rwandan populace contains the same ethnic groups as Burundi. In 1959, when the majority Hutus overthrew ruling minority Tutsis Rwanda became the scene of a bloody power transfer. The violence caused a mass exodus of Tutsis into neighboring Burundi. The Hutus within Burundi mirrored the situation in Rwanda and thought they should be given a bigger role in government. The Tutsis also saw Rwanda as a warning of what could occur in their country and were determined to prevent a similar revolution in Burundi. To prevent the feared revolution, the Tutsi government implemented policies designed to gain a firmer grasp on all state institutions, including security. These policies led to an even higher state of tension and mistrust between the groups. The groups sat poised to a strike first against the other, before the other could act.[131]

An important fact that has emerged from studying civil wars is that if a conflict has not ended in its first year, then the probability of a protracted war increases. Such is the case in Burundi. The cyclical pattern of violence and civil wars within Burundi became a learning process for its inhabitants. Any attempts by the Hutus to seek justice or political equilibrium within Burundi triggered repression by the Tutsi government against the entire ethnic group.[132] The army's repressive methods reinforced the Hutus' belief that once hostilities broke out, they could expect a merciless reprisal against insurgent and civilian alike. The view that the army was a permanent threat gave the Hutus only two choices: preparing for a fight for survival or doing nothing and being killed anyway. This fight for survival has caused the prolonged determined fighting to continue throughout Burundi's history. The mistrust between the two ethnic groups and violent nature of the prolonged war offered no hope of compromise between the two

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[129] Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 256.

[130] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 36.

[131] Ibid., 37.

[132] Filip Reyntjens, *Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1995), 36–45.

groups. The assistance from external sources to the Hutu rebellion from Rwanda gave the Hutus hope that they might achieve victory. The previous civil wars were won by the army's pure brute force over the Hutus, not by negotiation. The fighting created no common ground on which to start any sort of negotiations seeking to end the civil war peacefully.[133]

The 1993 civil war has been longer than of any of the previous civil wars, mainly because the Hutus received diplomatic support from neighboring countries, as well as the financing, arms, and training they previously lacked.[134] While international community and neighboring African nations were able to provide a compromise to end the latest civil war by enacting reforms guaranteeing a distribution of political posts, these efforts failed and neglected to enact any lasting reforms to governance and justice. The distribution of power between rebel Hutu and ruling Tutsi elites has yielded a propensity for renewed violence at an even greater level.[135] With two powerful groups of elites basically holding the population hostage to facilitate their own personal gain, the likelihood of violence is even greater.

The civil war in Burundi is not solely based on ethnic conflict. It is more a case of powerful elites using ethnic tensions and mistrust to gain additional power and fulfill their self-interests. The ethnic tensions in either Rwanda or Burundi have effects in the other country. Due to their similar class and social structure, a perceived injustice in one country affects the other. Many Hutus believe democracy is a matter of numbers. They believe their numerical majority gives them the right to govern their country and, thus, provides the best hope for peace. With no recourse but war, the ethnic lines have been drawn and battle lines set for future conflict in Burundi.

Mozambique Civil War

The Mozambique Civil War is a unique study of a balance between internal and external influences.[136] The main belligerents in this conflict were the Mozambican National Resistance (in Portuguese, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, or RENAMO) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. The Mozambican National Resistance group formed primarily from external influence in Rhodesia and lacked any form of popular support within Mozambique. RENAMO had its roots in Rhodesian counterintelligence and drew financial and military support from South Africa. To the casual observer, this was merely external aggression designed to project power and influence into another country. However, this is not the case. It was a combination of

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[133] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 38.

[134] Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict,* 58–63.

[135] Reyntjens, *Burundi: Breaking the Cycle,* 36–45.

[136] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 157.

external influences seizing upon internal strife caused by the Mozambican government's policies.[137]

In Mozambique, socialist agriculture policies had failed. Political repression nationally and locally, had alienated the population and a south Mozambique was perceived as dominating politics. This internal friction can help explain how an external entity devoid of local support was able eventually to garner enough support and influence to evolve into a 20,000-person force with influence in every region of Mozambique.[138] This is a good example of how external organizations can influence a country's political future by using internal discord to foment a civil war.

Three fundamental points appear from this case study. It is important to understand the role external factors played in determining the initiation, duration, and intensity of this conflict. In every facet of the Mozambican civil war, foreign intervention played a crucial role. External influences and support provided the means to mobilize domestic support by stirring up domestic grievances, while at the same time controlling the resources to wage a protracted war and the financial incentives to end the war. External influences demonstrated their ability to finance a viable insurgency. "To successfully challenge a state, a rebel group must be able to finance itself."[139]

The second point is the influence internal grievances played in the onset, duration, and ultimately the termination of Mozambique's civil war. External agents were adept at raising an army within Mozambique, using a structure based on the nature of the internal grievances. The initial recruits came from the privileged class, which felt punished by the policies of the Mozambique government. The external nations took a growing interest in the peasant population, which felt oppressed by the government's economic and social policies. External forces seized on this discontent between the peasants and government and, by exploiting the peasants' grievances, created another arm of the rebel force.[140]

The third point is the role coercion played in how the war was fought at its earliest stages. The Mozambican National Resistance group used force at every turn and for any purpose. It used force in conscripting recruits, collecting resources, and in commanding and controlling the rebel groups within Mozambique. Even in areas where the Mozambican National

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[137] Ibid., 157–63.

[138] William Minter, *The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) as Described by Ex-participants,* Report Submitted to the Ford Foundation and Swedish International Development Agency, Washington, DC, March 1989, http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-49A-84-african_activist _archive-a0b2a8-a_12419.pdf (accessed April 16, 2012), 87.

[139] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 158.

[140] Ibid., 157–63.

Resistance group could expect little resistance and overt support, RENAMO still used force to get its way. Attracted by promises of material support and protection, the two main wings of the Mozambican National Resistance joined forces with the Rhodesian government. This created a direct line of influence and resources to the rebel groups within Mozambique. With external means securing the financial viability of the insurgency, the growing movement attracted opportunists rather than activists.[141]

A key observation arising from this case study is that the insurgency did not emerge from a group of young, uneducated, and unemployed men. Instead, the insurgency was built on a collection of discontented Mozambican soldiers and privileged Mozambicans repressed by the government's policies. External influences that played on internal grievances defined Mozambique's war. With a new government, weak economic base, and inability to control all of the nation's territory, Mozambique was ripe for civil war.[142]

Civil War Lessons

Civil wars and other forms of warfare that fall under the U.S. category of irregular warfare can offer many examples and lessons that doctrine writers can use to create a better-informed COIN doctrine.[143] The case studies of Burundi and Mozambique provide examples in which current doctrine could not be applied successfully without significant amendment. In the Burundi case study, the ethnic tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis demonstrated that the insurgent forces already had the support of their respective ethnic populations and never attempted to influence the other side. In this case, the Tutsis simply used armed force to suppress the other ethnic groups to maintain majority control. Current doctrine would lead a military planner toward separating the population from the insurgents. In Burundi, there is no unaffected population group that can be separated from the insurgent force.

Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine states that long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule.[144] In the case of Burundi, this would not be an achievable goal. Doctrine also states that achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible.[145] The cause of the Hutu rebellion in Burundi was the Tutsi government itself. By doctrine, to achieve success in Burundi, the government would have to remove itself, thereby creating the

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[141] Ibid., 163.

[142] Ibid., 168.

[143] Gorka and Kilcullen, "Actor-centric Theory of War," 15.

[144] FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

[145] Ibid.

contradiction that the goal of a counterinsurgency was to cause the people to accept the government's legitimacy.[146]

Mozambique endured a civil war fostered and exploited by external forces seeking to destabilize the government. Even if Mozambique had enacted policies designed to eliminate grievances internally, the external forces would have continued their external support to keep the civil war going.[147] The government of Mozambique could have enacted internal policies to reduce the number of disgruntled middle-class citizens joining the struggle, but the external forces would exert pressures on the lower class to fill that void. The internal discord was not the cause of the Mozambique civil war. Enacting policies designed to rectify perceived grievances among the population would not have been as effective as disrupting and destroying the external insurgent network.

Many lessons from civil wars, revolutions, and other insurgencies can help reinforce U.S. Army doctrine. These lessons come in many forms and, as these two case studies showed, each involves its own strategic context. Civil wars occur due to ethnic tensions, perceived mistrust, abuse of power, negligent policies, and economic turmoil.[148] In these two case studies, the research showed that a civil war is a complex problem, usually ill defined, and requires a comprehensive approach toward resolution. Civil wars differ from doctrine-defined insurgencies in that, in some cases, insurgents do not attempt to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the population and, thereby, gain control of the government.

Conclusion

The research shows that while current U.S. COIN doctrine has returned counterinsurgency to the forefront, doctrine writers have not provided any new ideas or radically transformed concepts. In fact, the research shows that U.S. Army writers used selective historical examples to inform current doctrine. Current U.S. COIN doctrine has drawn on observations of military efforts dating back to World War II with only minor adjustments while amplifying data from a select group of sources along the way. This research concluded that Gorka and Kilcullen were correct in stating that current doctrine writers relied on previous historical examples and past U.S. Army doctrine to formulate the general thesis of the current COIN manual. Further evidence gathered during the research leads to the conclusion that lessons from case studies such as Burundi and Mozambique offer a variety of lessons that could better inform doctrine found in FM 3-24.

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[146] Ibid., 1-0.

[147] Ibid., 1-2.

[148] Collier and Sambanis, *Africa,* 56.

This research set out to answer two questions: first, do Gorka and Kilcullen accurately describe the defects in the Army COIN doctrine's development, and, second, does the failure to study examples of civil wars and revolutions matter? The first question was answered by examining the history of the development of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. The research showed that the authors relied on historical examples of Western encounters with partisans, guerrillas, and insurgents to provide the foundational elements of COIN doctrine. Throughout the history of the U.S. Army, COIN doctrine has experienced episodes of neglect and revival. During these episodes, doctrine writers added to and changed doctrine, but still relied on past doctrine and typical Western historical examples for their amplifying data. The French experiences in Algeria had the most profound effect on U.S. Army COIN doctrine. The research has shown that Galula's thoughts, based on the French counterinsurgency experience in Algeria, are woven intricately into the 2006 version of U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*.

The second question was answered by first examining definitions associated with insurgency, civil war, and revolutions. These definitions helped to surround the case studies of Burundi and Mozambique with adequate context. From the case studies in this research, the second question was answered by observing that there are lessons that the authors of U.S. doctrine have missed by not widening the scope of research when writing COIN doctrine. U.S. Army writers do not currently consider some civil wars and revolutions in writing COIN doctrine. The research shows that further, detailed research is needed to determine whether the U.S. Army would benefit from additional doctrinal guidance focused on revolutions and civil wars. The wide range of data gathered from expanded research may be more useful as a separate doctrine document.

Current U.S. Army COIN doctrine is not comprehensive enough to address the many contextual situations surrounding the multiple examples of civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies around the world. The claims of Gorka and Kilcullen are valid and would benefit from further examination. The findings from subsequent research must be added to current U.S. Army doctrine.

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